Oregon sued, and both the district court and the Ninth Circuit concluded that Ashcroft did not have the authority to override a state's decision about the legitimate medical purposes for which the state's doctors can prescribe drugs.
The linked preview provides the quick-and-dirty on the legal issues in the case, including the meaning and scope of the federal law, and the conflict between a state's right to regulate the practice of medicine within its borders and the federal desire to regulate the abuse of pharmaceutical drugs. Perhaps more interesting to those who don't thrill in the parsing of statutes is the discussion of the case's moral dimension.
Oregon ... insists that forbidding physicians from using [federally controlled] substances would eliminate "the most effective and humane means of easing death."
...
Some argue that a victory for Oregon would enable "enterprising purveyors of death", alluding to Dr. Kevorkian and the like, to capitalize on the suffering of the terminally ill by marketing lethal substances to physicians and patients. ... Others believe that a victory for Oregon will result in a domino effect of unethical practices, not unlike the Netherlands' experience with legalized assisted suicide—an experiment which evolved to encompass infants, minors, and the mentally ill.
The LII is not predicting a happy outcome for Oregon.
On its face, Gonzales v. Oregon (formerly Oregon v. Ashcroft), 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1299 (2005), is an intriguing case because it presents a clash of federal and state spheres of influence. On the one hand, the Attorney General has taken the position that Oregon's decision to permit physicians to distribute controlled substances for physician-assisted suicide is contrary to federal law. On the other hand, Oregon argues that the Attorney General has misinterpreted the [Controlled Substances Act] to invalidate state law that represents the democratic choice of the people of Oregon in the medical arena. These views present two different perspectives of the concept of federalism, while also implicating serious moral and policy concerns. Given framing of the central issues, the Court will not likely address this question on policy or moral grounds. The plain language of the CSA, Congressional intent and administrative law will all inform the Court's decision. The Court will likely avoid such slippery slope issues in favor of uniformity in the implementation of the CSA, perhaps a more preferable outcome to variable multi-state regulation. The safe route to resolving this case with the minimal amount of controversy suggests that change may be on the horizon for the Oregon Act.
