The first case she cited, a Maryland case named Griffen v. State pertains to social media webpages like My Space, not text messages. In footnote 13, Griffen says:

We further note that authentication concerns attendant to e-mails, instant messaging correspondence, and text messages differ significantly from those involving a MySpace profile and posting printout, because such correspondences is sent directly from one party to an intended recipient or recipients, rather than published for all to see.

The next case she gets from her book is Elack v. Conn. Had she looked it up rather than just read a blurb about it, she would know that the Conn. Supreme Court granted cert on it, oral argument was held in May, and it's ripe for a decision. It may not be good law after the next court reviews it.

She quotes a Mass. case which again deals with my space type social media. Mass. has a case for dealing with text messages, and it too doesn't say what Griffen and Elack say.

Commonwealth v. Amaral, 2011 Mass. App. LEXIS 107, at *7 (Mass. App. Ct. Jan. 26, 2011: The court reasons that "[t]he actions of the defendant himself served to authenticate the e-mails,” because one e-mail indicated that defendant would be at a certain place at a certain time and the defendant appeared at that place and time, and in another email, defendant provided his telephone number and immediately answered when the investigator called that number);

In fact, most cases make the distinction, likes those cited in Footnote 13 of Griffen:

We further note that authentication concerns attendant to e-mails, instant messaging correspondence, and text messages differ significantly from those involving a MySpace profile and posting printout, because such correspondences is sent directly from one party to an intended recipient or recipients, rather than published for all to see. See Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 407 Md. 415, 423, 966 A.2d 432, 437 (2009)(contrasting emails and instant messages with a “different category of Internet communications, in which users post statements to the world at large without specification,” such as on social networking sites). See also States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D.D.C. 2006) (reasoning e-mails could be authenticated by comparison by the jury with those e-mails that had already been independently authenticated through the contents or in the email heading itself); Commonwealth v. Amaral, No. 09-P-2284, 2011 Mass. App. LEXIS 107, at *7 (Mass. App. Ct. Jan. 26, 2011) (reasoning that “[t]he actions of the defendant himself served to authenticate the e-mails,” because one e-mail indicated that defendant would be at a certain place at a certain time and the defendant appeared at that place and time, and in another email, defendant provided his telephone number and immediately answered when the investigator called that number); Dickens v. State, 175 Md. App. 231,238-40, 927 A.2d 32, 36-37 (2007) (reasoning text messages received on victim’s cell phone were properly authenticated because the phone number on one message showed that it had come from defendant’s phone and other messages referenced the defendant’s right to see the couple’s minor child and their wedding vows).

When it comes to text messages, courts around the country have been developing a less restrictive test for authentication.

As another case puts it:

Rule 901 “does not erect a particularly high hurdle, and that hurdle may be cleared by circumstantial evidence.” Peter T. Hoffman, Texas Rules of Evidence Handbook, Article IX at 948 (8th ed. 2008-09) (quoting United States v. Chin, 371 F.3d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 2004)). The proponent of evidence does not need to “rule out all possibilities inconsistent with authenticity, or to prove beyond any doubt that the evidence is what it purports to be.” Id. In fact, in performing its gate-keeping function under rule 104, the trial court itself need not be persuaded that the proffered evidence is authentic. Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638. Rather, the ultimate question of whether an item of evidence is what the proponent claims is a question for the fact finder. Id. In a jury trial, the preliminary question for the trial court to decide is simply whether the proponent of the proffered evidence has supplied facts that are sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination that the evidence is authentic. Id.; see also Manuel v. State, 357 S.W.3d 66, 74 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2011, pet. ref’d) (“The proponent must only produce sufficient evidence that a reasonable fact finder could properly find genuineness.”).

Other cases with similar rulings:

• Manuel v Texas

• Tienda v.State (Texas)

As another case says: For emails and text messages, the question is one for the jury

Methods of authentication include presenting a witness with personal knowledge of the information (they wrote it, they received it, or they copied it), searching the computer itself to see if it was used to post or create the information, or attempting to obtain the information in question from the actual social media company that maintained the information the ordinary course of their business. Courts largely seem to be erring on the side of admissibility and leaving any concerns about the evidence itself, such as who authored the evidence or whether the evidence is legitimate, to jurors to decide what weight to give that evidence.

Courts distinguish between authentication of social networking evidence and authentication of "e-mails, instant messaging correspondence, and text messages." because it is "sent directly from one party to an intended recipient or recipients, rather than published for all to see.")

There's also People v. Pierre,41 A.D.3d 289, 838 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548-49 (N.Y.App. Div. 2007) (where person sent instant message to screen name and received reply, content on reply supported conclusion that message was sent by defendant, and no evidence was admitted to show anyone else had motive or opportunity to impersonate defendant by using his screen name).

A federal case that is often cited in many jurisdictions is United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2006))

The possibility of alteration does not and cannot be the basis for excluding e-mails as unidentified or unauthenticated as a matter of course, any more than it can be the rationale for excluding paper documents (and copies of those documents). We live in an age of technology and computer use where e-mail communication now is a normal and frequent fact for the majority of this nation’s population, and is of particular importance in the professional world. The defendant is free to raise this issue with the jury and put on evidence that e-mails are capable of being altered before they are passed on. Absent specific evidence showing alteration, however, the Court will not exclude any embedded e-mails because of the mere possibility that it can be done.

("The burden of proof for authentication is slight, and the court 'need not find that the evidence is necessarily what the proponent claims, but only that there is sufficient evidence that the jury ultimately might do so.' ")

Also:

If testimony is unavailable, courts have permitted electronic data to be admitted under FRE 901(b)(4), which permits authentication through distinctive characteristics such as the document’s “[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.”

Florida's authentication rule states:

90.901 Requirement of authentication or identification.--

Authentication or identification of evidence is required as a condition precedent to its admissibility. The requirements of this section are satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.

In the 2012 Florida case State v Symonette,

"Evidence may be authenticated by appearance, content, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics taken in conjunction with the circumstances. In addition, the evidence may be authenticated either by using extrinsic evidence, or by showing that it meets the requirements for self-authentication.".... "And, unless #39;clearly erroneous,' the trial court's determination must stand."

In the month old Florida decision in Jean-Philippe v. State, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 1183, 19-20 (Fla. June 13, 2013), the court said:

Finally, some of appellant's statements in the text messages were admissible under HN4section 90.803(18)(a), Florida Statutes (2009), which provides that regardless of the availability of the declarant, "[a] statement that is offered against a party and is . . . [t]he party's own statement" is admissible

In the Florida case of State v. Lumarque, 44 So. 3d 171, 172-173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2010. the court said:

At an in limine hearing, the trial court found the two images and one text message the ex-wife testified to admissible, but concluded the remaining exhibits inadmissible as the ex-wife could not authenticate them. The court erred. The images and text messages were found on the defendant's cellular telephone, seized pursuant to a search of the defendant's home through a warrant shortly after the alleged incident. This fact, testified by the State's forensics expert, is sufficient to authenticate these exhibits. U.S. v. Caldwell, 776 F. 2d 989, 1001-02 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that authentication of evidence merely requires a finding that the evidence is what it purports to be). It also is immaterial that the ex-wife could not identify each of the messages being shown to her on the night of the incident. Regardless how these images and text messages might have found their way onto the defendant's cellular telephone, the State has presented sufficient evidence at this stage that these exhibits constitute evidence of motive. Craig v. State, 510 So. 2d 857, 863 (Fla. 1987) (stating that evidence of motive is admissible when it would help the jury understand other evidence). Accordingly, they are admissible into evidence at the trial of this case upon the State laying the proper predicates as indicated by this opinion. In all other respects, we summarily affirm the order on appeal.

In the Maryland case of Carpenter v. State and the PA case of In re F.P., 2005 PA Super 220, P 5, 878 A.2d 91, 93 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)

[the court] reject[ed] a contention that "it was incumbent upon the Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania] to authenticate [computerized instant messages] by introducing evidence of their source from [an] internet service provider or presenting the testimony of a computer forensics expert".

Unless the state can prove the texts were not sent to or written by Trayvon, since they were on his phone (and needed a double password to delete) the fact that someone else might have used his phone to send them is a matter that goes to the weight the jury gives the evidence. If otherwise admissible as a state of mind hearsay exception, or some other exception, they should come in.

Don West, in oral argument, gave Nelson far more circumstantial evidence than necessary to get these texts in. I won't repeat his arguments, you can watch the last 20 minutes of last night's hearing.

The Judge needs to recess this trial until Monday, so the defense can do the research it needs as it prepares for its final witnesses, and have time to find and subpoena Lavondria and Mike F., Demetrius Martin and Rachel if need be, to have them verify these were texts they received from Martin. If they can't do that, the texts should still be allowed through all the circumstantial evidence that supports Martin sent and received the texts on his phone.

Trayon's texts about fighting are relevant to his state of mind and a hearsay exception. They also go to his physical condition. These are relevant areas for Zimmerman to bring into evidence. It's not character evidence, instances of prior bad acts or reputation evidence. Even if they don't have a live witness to authenticate them, they have an excellent expert who can do that through similarities of content.

I expect we'll see some very tired and cranky lawyers in the morning. Judge Nelson may be tired as well, if she stayed up to make the decisions as she said she would. This trial is running ahead of schedule. There's no time limit. She needs to ease up and give the lawyers time to finish their depositions, prepare their witnesses, research their issues and argue motions during the workday and make timely rulings.