Jeffrey Rosen, writing for Wired, discusses a non-privacy threatening identification card. He says that by stressing verification over identification, civil libertarians can rest easy.

But a privacy-friendly card is feasible if it follows one simple rule: verification, not identification. In other words, the card would confirm identity but wouldn't allow the government to pick you out of a crowd. There's a model: In 1995, Canadian entrepreneur George Tomko invented an innovative technology that made it possible to lock packets of data in encrypted files, using a fingerprint as a private key. After clearing a background check, the users of a Tomko-like card would receive a digitized packet of information that said, for example, they were cleared to cross a particular border. They'd download the parcel onto a card and lock it with a thumbprint.

Using this card at a border checkpoint, they'd swipe it and then provide a thumbprint. If the print decrypted the file, the system would verify their identity. Because the fingerprints wouldn't be stored in a central database, individuals would retain complete control over how much personal information was revealed. To maximize privacy, the system would keep no identifiable records of who had passed through, and it would not be linked with any other databases that might allow predictions of future behavior.

"Media mogul" Steven Brill (formerly the CEO of Court TV and Brill's Content Magazine) has a company, Verified Identity, that anticipates having a (not quite as privacy friendly) version of the card and turnstiles in place by February.

Rosen points out a crucial fact: There is no evidence that identity cards will make us safer:

Even with careful attention to privacy, an ID card might do little to prevent another terrorist attack. Bruce Schneier, one of the world's leading computer security experts, says that any identification system that relies on background checks creates three categories of people: trusted, untrusted, and trusted-but-malicious - people who aren't on watch lists but turn out to be terrorists anyway. As Schneier pointed out to me, Ted Kaczynski and Richard Reid would have qualified for V-IDs. Brill says that the pressure for ID cards will be overwhelming after the next attack, so a well-designed one is better than a desperate one. But rather than fixating on whether ID cards threaten privacy, civil libertarians and techno-positivists should explore security measures that might actually thwart terrorism. Otherwise, feel-good solutions could make us less safe in the end.