I'll refer again to just one hearing, but this was repeated in many hearings:

GEN. CLARK: I've been concerned that the attention on Iraq will distract us from what we're doing with respect to al Qaeda. . . . So, I think, as a minimum, that when one opens up another campaign, there is a diversion of effort. The question is whether the diversion of effort is productive or counterproductive. I really -- it's -- there are forces operating in both directions at this point. You can make the argument, as General Shalikashvili did, that you want to cut off all sources of supply. Problem with that argument is that Iran really has had closer linkages with the terrorists in the past and still does, apparently, today, than Iraq does. So that leads you to then ask, well, what will be the impact on Iran? . . .

SEN. CLELAND: And if you took out Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party, the secularist party, don't the Sunnis and the Shi'ite Muslims make up a majority of the population in Iraq, and wouldn't that give Iran a strong hand there, and we ultimately end up creating a Muslim state, even under democratic institutions?

GEN. CLARK: Yes, sir. I think that there is a substantial risk in the aftermath of the operation that we could end up with a problem which is more intractable than we have today.

One thing we're pretty clear on is that Saddam has a very effective police state apparatus. He doesn't allow challenges to his authority inside that state. When we go in there with a transitional government and a military occupation of some indefinite duration, it's also very likely that if there is an effective al Qaeda left -- and there certainly will be an effective organization of extremists -- they will pour into that country because they must compete for the Iraqi people; the Wahabes with the Sunnis, the Shi'as from Iran working with the Shi'a population. So it's not beyond consideration that we would have a radicalized state, even under a U.S. occupation in the aftermath.

SEN. CLELAND: General Hugh Shelton told me about a week ago, in his great North Carolina accent, which I understand -- (laughter) -- that if Saddam Hussein were removed and the Ba'ath Party ousted, that the Kurds, the Shi'ites and the Sunnis would go at each other like banshee chickens.

General Hoar, what's our first priority militarily? Is it the al Qaeda?

GEN. HOAR: Our first priority has got to be al Qaeda. And the reason, Senator, is that we are dependent on our European friends and the Arabs and the Muslims around the world. The successes we've had in Morocco, in Yemen, in Pakistan, in Germany, have come as a result of integrated intelligence, of police work. These are the kinds of things that we need. At the end of the day, shutting down the money, using police to find these independent cells around the world will make the difference. And we are absolutely dependent on the goodwill and cooperation of these other countries, some of whom have large populations that don't agree with American policies. And so I think until we have this under control, we should give it our number one attention.

With respect to Iraq, the question that you asked Wes a moment ago, in my time at CENTCOM, one of the major concerns was always the fragmentation of Iraq, if there had been an internal breakup or it was done externally. Iraq is a creation of the Ottoman Empire and British colonialism; it was never a country of itself. And as a result, it will always be susceptible to that problem. And the borders were drawn artificially, and we live with that problem with Kuwait and Iraq today.

. . . SEN. DANIEL AKAKA (D-HI): A study by the Army's Center of Military History suggests that we might need to keep 100,000 troops in Iraq and 300,000 in Afghanistan if we are going to stabilize these countries. General McNeill is quoted today saying that there are as many as 1,000 al Qaeda fighters still active in Afghanistan.

I am concerned that focusing on an invasion of Iraq, in doing that we may reduce critical assets, including intelligence, that we need to stabilize Afghanistan.

My question to you is, do you think there will be some degradation of our military capabilities in Afghanistan if we do attack Iraq in the next few months? ....

GEN. CLARK: . . . I think the real issue is whether there's synergy between the two operations or not, and there are arguments to be made on both sides. There are those who say that if we go in to Iraq, it will send a very strong message to those nations that are playing both sides -- countries like, for example, Yemen, where we've had some difficulty gaining access, and it may send the kind of message to Yemen that says we're going to get rid of al Qaeda right now, turn them all over, invite the Americans in. On the other hand, if we go in unilaterally, or without the full weight of international organizations behind us, if we go in with a very sparse number of allies, if we go in without an effective information operation that takes us through the -- and explains the motives and purposes and very clear aims and the ability to deal with the humanitarian and post-conflict situation, we're liable to super-charge recruiting for al Qaeda. So I think it's indeterminate at this point how much synergy there is. It's not a given that there's synergy, but there is a possibility of synergy between the two operations. There's also a possibility of some fatal conflict between the two operations.

AKAKA: In the Persian Gulf War, we did not go all the way to Baghdad and replace Saddam Hussein. If we are planning to do so this time, most of you suggest that we should be planning also for what we will do in Iraq afterwards.

General McInerney, you suggested we need a shadow government. Do you have any thoughts you can share with us about what we should be doing now and who should be responsible for developing a post-Saddam occupation strategy? Is there one being designed at the present time? General Shalikashvili?

GEN. SHALIKASHVILI: One of my colleagues mentioned that perhaps a more difficult and perhaps equally important part of our thinking should be devoted to what will happen after we go in, as it is, about how we get in and so on. And I fully agree with that. And yet this is the most difficult thing to do, and it's most difficult to pin the tail on the donkey as to who it is that is responsible for it. Surprisingly enough, in the open press, in the open discussion -- that's all that I have access to -- there's been very little of that discussion. There's been very little about what opposition forces there are, what political elements there are to tie together these disparate groups, between the North and the center and the South. And we've already talked about the potential of them splintering, and none of us are really sure whether that will happen or not. But there needs to be someone worrying about it, and a blueprint needs to exist as to who will do what. . . .

SEN. AKAKA: General Clark?

GEN. CLARK: Well, I just want to underscore everything General Shali had to say on that. I think that it's a very, very difficult task. I think it's really the critical task in terms of winning. I think it's the most difficult part of this operation. It has not received adequate attention in public discussion. Whether there have been decisions made on this or not, I don't know.

The track record in Afghanistan is that we're more lucky than we are good there. There are still enormous problems to be dealt with, particularly on the reconstruction side. We know the military is not the right institution to do this. We know from our experience in Bosnia and in Haiti that you can't -- and Kosovo, that you can't just dump this on the United Nations; that there has to be a support organization established.

. . . So it's the United States government that has to take the lead in planning this. In the mid-1990s, we created an organization, a framework for this, Presidential Decision Directive -- I think it was 55 or -- PDD-56 I think it was, in which there was a mechanism for tasking each of the agencies of government. Whether that's in place or not, I don't know. But it is the most challenging part of this operation, and the United States government needs to take the lead before it hands it off to the United Nations.

SEN. AKAKA: General Hoar?

GEN. HOAR: Yes, sir. I think, as my colleagues have said, this is the part of this operation that has received very little attention. And given the failure in 1991 to have a war termination plan that would allow us to have a set of circumstances exist in Iraq that would be favorable to us, it seems to me that we should not go down this road again.

What to do after we get to Baghdad seems to me a little bit like what happens to the dog when he finally catches the car. What are we going to do now? And I would suggest to you that it's a National Security Council issue, and it needs to be developed. And I sure hope that this committee and other committees would ask the administration what their plans are after they get to Baghdad and "catch the car."

And of course, this general's warnings were not only ignored, he was fired for making them:

The magnitude of the postwar troop commitment described by the Army's top officer, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, is much larger than what other American officials have outlined. Pentagon officials have said that about 100,000 American troops may be needed in the post-Saddam phase, along with tens of thousands of additional allied forces.

"Something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required," General Shinseki told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee today. "We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems."

General Shinseki continued, "It takes a significant ground force presence to maintain a safe and secure environment, to ensure that people are fed, that water is disturbed, all the normal responsibilities that go along with administering a situation like this."

Remember what Wolfowitz said but the war and the aftermath? How many and how much and who would pay?

In a contentious exchange over the costs of war with Iraq, the Pentagon's second-ranking official today disparaged a top Army general's assessment of the number of troops needed to secure postwar Iraq. House Democrats then accused the Pentagon official, Paul D. Wolfowitz, of concealing internal administration estimates on the cost of fighting and rebuilding the country.

Mr. Wolfowitz, the deputy defense secretary, opened a two-front war of words on Capitol Hill, calling the recent estimate by Gen. Eric K. Shinseki of the Army that several hundred thousand troops would be needed in postwar Iraq, "wildly off the mark." Pentagon officials have put the figure closer to 100,000 troops. Mr. Wolfowitz then dismissed articles in several newspapers this week asserting that Pentagon budget specialists put the cost of war and reconstruction at $60 billion to $95 billion in this fiscal year. He said it was impossible to predict accurately a war's duration, its destruction and the extent of rebuilding afterward.

. . . A spokesman for General Shinseki, Col. Joe Curtin, said today that the general stood by his estimate. "He was asked a question and he responded with his best military judgment," Colonel Curtin said. General Shinseki is a former commander of the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia.

In his testimony, Mr. Wolfowitz ticked off several reasons why he believed a much smaller coalition peacekeeping force than General Shinseki envisioned would be sufficient to police and rebuild postwar Iraq. He said there was no history of ethnic strife in Iraq, as there was in Bosnia or Kosovo. He said Iraqi civilians would welcome an American-led liberation force that "stayed as long as necessary but left as soon as possible," but would oppose a long-term occupation force. And he said that nations that oppose war with Iraq would likely sign up to help rebuild it. "I would expect that even countries like France will have a strong interest in assisting Iraq in reconstruction," Mr. Wolfowitz said. He added that many Iraqi expatriates would likely return home to help.

. . . Enlisting countries to help to pay for this war and its aftermath would take more time, he said. "I expect we will get a lot of mitigation, but it will be easier after the fact than before the fact," Mr. Wolfowitz said. Mr. Wolfowitz spent much of the hearing knocking down published estimates of the costs of war and rebuilding, saying the upper range of $95 billion was too high, and that the estimates were almost meaningless because of the variables. Moreover, he said such estimates, and speculation that postwar reconstruction costs could climb even higher, ignored the fact that Iraq is a wealthy country, with annual oil exports worth $15 billion to $20 billion. "To assume we're going to pay for it all is just wrong," he said.

At the Pentagon, Mr. Rumsfeld said the factors influencing cost estimates made even ranges imperfect. Asked whether he would release such ranges to permit a useful public debate on the subject, Mr. Rumsfeld said, "I've already decided that. It's not useful."

Yes, many warnings on Iraq were ignored by Bush. And by a whole lotta people in Washington.