Tom Schaller's truculence is somewhat understandable. He has been hit with some unfair attacks:
At mydd, Jerome Armstrong criticizes Tom Schaller for his thesis (it is mine too) that Democrats can not shape their message determined to do better in the South. Like Schaller, I thiink it is not the right approach for Democrats. Armstrong writes:
Stoller's argument ends with a point that might charitably be called a caveat: Maybe there's something I don't get about how special the South is. And that serves as a segue into talking about Tom Schaller's book, "Whistling Past Dixie". It's a point to which a southerner might reply as "typical yankee shit". It's a rather remarkable book though, using statistics to make the case that Democrats can win a majority without the south. And that's probably true, but it's Schaller's first recomendation on "The Path to a National Democratic Majority", that Democrats define the south in the most denigrate ways, to run against the south for an enduring majority, that is morally and strategically wrong.
This is misstatement from Armstrong. The strategy is NOT to denigrate the South, it is to NOT kowtow to it. It is to paint the GOP as extreme and unacceptable. Not to paint the South as anything. It is to use the power of negative branding against the GOP, NOT against the South. Armstrong misuderstands the difference between national branding and the 50 state strategy of devolution of power to state parties. He really muddles the entire subject. Not his best by a long shot.
Howard Dean's 50 State Strategy is the path that allows Democrats to adapt to the realities Schaller describes while at the same time searching for the effective political prescriptions for the South. As I wrote, the devolution of power to the state parties is the essential component:
I did support his run for
DNC Chairman, I thought he could bring an energy and a grassroots following to our Party, which was sorely in need of it.
But I think Dean has brought a vision that is as valuable as that energy - and that vision is described thusly in Matt Bai's NYTimes Sunday Magazine piece:
the Democratic Party needed to be decentralized, so that grass-roots Democrats built relationships with their state parties but had little to do with Washington at all. "State parties are not the intermediaries," he said. "If I get them trained right, they're the principals."
In other words, I suggested, he was talking about "devolving" the national Democratic Party, in the same way that Reagan and other conservative ideologues had always talked about devolving the federal government and returning power to the states. "That's what I want to do," Dean said firmly.
Matt Bai misinterpets this vision as an attack on the national party structure - an attempt to "starve the beast" to irrelevance, Bai called it. I think it is quite the opposite. It is an attempt to renew the relevance of the Democratic Party as a whole, which is much more than the DNC headquarters in Washington, D.C., indeed the heart and soul of the Party is the millions of Democrats across the nation - our Big Tent.
Multiple local and regional Dem messages are necessary. The Big Tent. And Howard Dean understands this. Thus his devolution strategy is essential to making a national Democratic Party, a Big Tent Democratic Party, a relevant and powerful reality. The devil is in the details of course, but the big picture is essential, and I think Dean gets the big picture.