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Boumediene and Eisentrager

In my previous writings on the Boumediene constitutional habeas corpus cases, I argued that the DC district court and the DC Circuit court misread the important Eisentrager precedent.

Today's SCOTUS decision rested in large part on clarifying this misreading of Eisentrager. From the opinion:

As we recognized in Rasul, 542 U. S., at 476; id., at 487 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment), the outlines of a framework for determining the reach of the Suspension Clause are suggested by the factors the Court relied upon in Eisentrager. In addition to the practical concerns discussed above, the Eisentrager Court found relevant that each petitioner:

“(a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and there held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f) and is at all times imprisoned outside the United States.” 339 U. S., at 777. Based on this language from Eisentrager, and the reasoning in our other extraterritoriality opinions, we conclude that at least three factors are relevant in determining the reach of the Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.

In the lower court decisions in Boumediene, the decisions simply misread Eisentrager. The SCOTUS gets it right today. I previously wrote about the Boumediene decisions:

Now we come to Judge Robertson's most grievous error:

Hamdan's lengthy detention beyond American borders but within the jurisdictional authority of the United States is historically unique. Nevertheless, . . . his connection to the United States lacks the geographical and volitional predicates necessary to claim a constitutional right to habeas corpus.

This is simply a complete misreading of Eisentrager. What did Eisentrager say on this point?

We are here confronted with a decision whose basic premise is that these prisoners are entitled, as a constitutional right, to sue in some court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus. To support that assumption we must hold that a prisoner of our military authorities is constitutionally entitled to the writ, even though he (a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United States; © was captured outside of our territory and there held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f) and is at all times imprisoned outside the United States.

Look at the facts the Eisentrager Court rel[ied] [up]on - the petitioner[s] ARE enemy aliens. The petitioners are being held OUTSIDE US territory. The petitioner were tried OUTSIDE of US territory. The petitioners were at all times imprisoned OUTSIDE of US territory.

None of these are accepted facts in [Boumediene]. And these are no mere details. They are central to the Eisentrager decision. It is the fact that the petitioners were enemy aliens - an undisputed fact - that [wa]s paramount in Eisentrager.

The Court today notes this distinction from Eisentrager:

Applying this framework, we note at the onset that the status of these detainees is a matter of dispute. The petitioners, like those in Eisentrager, are not American citizens.

But the petitioners in Eisentrager did not contest, it seems, the Court’s assertion that they were “enemy alien[s].” Ibid. In the instant cases, by contrast, the detainees deny they are enemy combatants. They have been afforded some process in CSRT proceedings to determine their status; but, unlike in Eisentrager, supra, at 766, there has been no trial by military commission for violations of the laws of war.

Precisely. As Justice Souter's concurrence states, this decision was no "bolt from the blue." Rasul practically dictated this decision:

Four years ago, this Court in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U. S. 466 (2004) held that statutory habeas jurisdiction extended to claims of foreign nationals imprisoned by the United States at Guantanamo Bay, “to determine the legality of the Executive’s potentially indefinite detention” of them, id., at 485. Subsequent legislation eliminated the statutory habeas jurisdiction over these claims, so that now there must be constitutionally based jurisdiction or none at all. JUSTICE SCALIA is thus correct that here, for the first time, this Court holds there is (he says “confers”) constitutional habeas jurisdiction over aliens imprisoned by the military outside an area of de jure national sovereignty, see post, at 1 (dissenting opinion). But no one who reads the Court’s opinion in Rasul could seriously doubt that the jurisdictional question must be answered the same way in purely constitutional cases, given the Court’s reliance on the historical background of habeas generally in answering the statutory question. . . . Of course, it takes more than a quotation from Rasul, however much on point, to resolve the constitutional issue before us here, which the majority opinion has explored afresh in the detail it deserves. But whether one agrees or disagrees with today’s decision, it is no bolt out of the blue.
< SCOTUS: Gitmo Detainees Have Constitutional Habeas Rights | A Quick Reading of Boumediene >
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      To clarify a little, BTD (5.00 / 4) (#2)
      by scribe on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 10:47:34 AM EST
      the "enemy aliens" language in Eisentrager, and now, can be confusing.  Different usages and meanings.

      In Eisentrager, an enemy alien was (to keep it short) a person, not a citizen of the United States, who was a citizen of a country with which the United States was at war (that war being a formally declared war, initiated, BTW, by Germany - in fulfillment of its Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis treaty obligations - and then responded to by the US).  (To digress, Eisentrager did not, IIRC, deal with the issues of dual citizenship, permanent residents, or whatever.)

      Since the individuals in Eisentrager were, IIRC, all German citizens and the United States was, at the time, involved in a formally declared war against Germany, there was no disputing, and no sense disputing, their status as enemy aliens.

      Today, however, there is neither a formal declaration of war by (or against) the United States.  Nor is there a country called Al Qaeda of which these detainees are citizens or which could, in the formalities of diplomacy, formally declare war (or have war declared against it).  Rather, today's detainees' status as "alien enemy combatants" (or whatever the government's calling them today) derives solely from the Executive's determination that they - personally - were enemies of the United States.  It is a determination based upon personal, rather than status, factors.  And, FWIW, wholly an arbitrary determination.

      In Eisentrager, all German citizens were enemy aliens.  Today, Mr. Boumedienne is a citizen of who knows where - the opinion does not say (AFAIK)- but surely not of a country with which the United States is at war.  But, as clearly, not all persons of Boumediene's citizenship are enemy aliens.

      Thus, the Eisentrager reliance on determination as "enemy alien" is useless in the current context and, it appears, the Court recognized this.

      I hope I'm making sense - I've been interrupted three times which writing this comment.

      This is part of the problem (5.00 / 2) (#5)
      by kredwyn on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 11:17:17 AM EST
      when the "enemy" is a concept and not a country.

      Parent
      Soon "fremenies" will be ... (none / 0) (#18)
      by Robot Porter on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 12:51:33 PM EST
      a legally binding term as well.

      Parent
      Oh goodness... (none / 0) (#19)
      by kredwyn on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 12:58:32 PM EST
      Now there's a scary thought.

      Parent
      So in the absence of a declaration (none / 0) (#6)
      by gyrfalcon on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 11:31:33 AM EST
      of war, or even an undeclared state of war between the U.S. and, say, Pakistan or Sudan or wherever each of these detainees is from, the classification of "enemy" can only reside in the person himself-- meaning the government has already convicted him, in effect.  A Catch-22 worthy of Kafka. (heh)  In that case, indeed, there would be no need for any kind of trial or hearing or anything else, which I guess was the Bush admin.'s original idea.

      There's a special place in hell reserved for people who think that way, IMHO, and it's right next to the people who want to fly planes into buildings.

      Thank God there are places too far for Kennedy to go.

      Parent

      The way you put it (none / 0) (#1)
      by rilkefan on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 10:43:56 AM EST
      it sounds like a trivial argument.  Are the judges who disagree being hacks (maybe that's what "grievous error" means in lay English)?

      There Are Only Two Reasons (none / 0) (#3)
      by Mouthful of Politics on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 11:10:25 AM EST
      ...why any district court judge could have gotten it so wrong.

      A) Incompetence
      B) Partisanship (as noted above by Rilkefan)

      Thanks for catching this. Good reading.

      In a Republican judiciary dominated by (5.00 / 1) (#4)
      by Joelarama on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 11:16:50 AM EST
      Federalist Society types, sometimes going plainly against precedent is the best way to telegraph one's loyalty for elevation to the next higher court.

      Parent
      The majority's discussion of Eisentrager (none / 0) (#7)
      by Categorically Imperative on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 11:39:57 AM EST
      is good, but the the way the Court reaches its ultimate holding is ridiculous.  In Kennedy's view, the historical record regarding the common law is equivocal (I disagree, and think the Indian precedents are dispositive in the detainees' favor).  Kennedy, having staked out that position for the majority, then goes on to reason that, despite there being no real evidence in favor of either side "separation of powers principles" dictate that the detainees should get habeas.

      This is ridiculous.  In order to think the writ has been suspended, you have to prove that detainees at GTMO would have had access to habeas corpus under British common law circa 1789.  Otherwise, there is no suspension and no violation of the separation of powers.  

      Kennedy's opinion is illogical in the most basic sense, and Scalia correctly calls him on it.  I think the result is correct, but I wish the majority opinion were on stronger footing.

      Sure (none / 0) (#8)
      by Big Tent Democrat on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 11:41:23 AM EST
      Politics is politics. Yes, CI, there is politics on the SCOTUS too.

      Parent
      I never was (none / 0) (#9)
      by Categorically Imperative on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 11:46:13 AM EST
      a big fan of legal realism

      Parent
      Get over it (5.00 / 1) (#11)
      by Big Tent Democrat on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 11:48:53 AM EST
      The good news is (none / 0) (#13)
      by Categorically Imperative on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 11:58:35 AM EST
      maybe this is the end of the political question doctrine.  More likely, this opinion (which applied logically would overrule AEDPA) will be confined to a Bush v. Gore, don't ever cite this for anything realm.

      Parent
      I'll cite Rasul (none / 0) (#15)
      by Big Tent Democrat on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 11:59:24 AM EST
      as Souter did.

      Parent
      Me either. (none / 0) (#16)
      by Same As It Ever Was on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 12:16:10 PM EST
      But it's the world we live in.

      Parent
      Kennedy found a way to find with the liberals (none / 0) (#10)
      by andgarden on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 11:46:24 AM EST
      no?

      Parent
      What liberals? (5.00 / 1) (#17)
      by Molly Bloom on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 12:43:48 PM EST
      This court is made up of moderates and conservatives. Marshall and Brennan are long gone.

      Parent
      Yes (none / 0) (#12)
      by Categorically Imperative on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 11:55:03 AM EST
      And I'll give him credit for that, but his opinion is baloney.  In Rasul, Kennedy was obviously comfortable holding that habeas' "historical reach" would encompass GTMO.  Today he says that there really isn't any historical evidence in the detainees' favor.  

      This opinion is going to be a lightning rod for the judicial restraint types, and it didn't need to be.  The historical precedent is there; Kennedy (for reasons at which I could only guess) dismissed it.

      Parent

      Well, it's a gift horse (none / 0) (#14)
      by andgarden on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 11:59:22 AM EST
      Some people see Roe that way n/t (none / 0) (#20)
      by rilkefan on Thu Jun 12, 2008 at 03:05:19 PM EST