She was a CIA agent who was outed by the Vice-President, loosely speaking.

I guess he outranks her, doesn't he.

Indeed, it is where Congress has intentionally withheld a remedy that we must most refrain from providing one because it is in those situations that "appropriate judicial deference" is especially due to the considered judgment of Congress that certain remedies are not warranted. See Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423. That deference must be given whether Congress has chosen to exclude a remedy for particular claims, as in Bush and
Chilicky, or from particular defendants, as here. Provided "Congress has put in place a comprehensive system to administer public rights, has `not inadvertently' omitted damages remedies for certain claimants, and has not plainly
expressed an intention that the courts preserve Bivens remedies," Spagnola, 859 F.2d at 228, we cannot create additional remedies. Therefore, because Congress created a comprehensive Privacy Act scheme that did not inadvertently exclude a remedy for the claims brought against these defendants, we will not supplement the scheme with Bivens remedies.

The problem with this formulation is well expressed in Judge Rogers dissent:

The Act balanced these individual
protections against the government's legitimate need for information and information systems,2 but did not eliminate other protections under the Constitution. The issue presented is thus
not whether any individual may obtain some relief regarding information that is protected under the Act, but whether the Wilsons are to be afforded an opportunity to obtain relief for alleged constitutional violations against which the Act provides no protection. Nothing in Congress's decision to limit remedies under the Act to individuals with agency records or to exempt
the offices of the President and Vice President shows an intention to deny a cause of action for violations of the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, as the legislative history
makes clear, see, e.g., S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 15 (1974)

The majority ignores this salient argument in its opinion, as it must, as it has no answer to this argument.

Another interesting point is whether the Wilson's attorney's properly framed Valerie Wilson's claims as grounded in the First Amendment as well. Third Party standing for claiming a First Amendment retaliatory action by a government under Section 1983 is well established. See, e.g., El Dia v Rossello. I am not familiar if it is similarly established under Bivens jurisprudence.