SAMs are special restrictions that may be imposed where determined to be “reasonably necessary to protect persons against the risk of death or serious bodily injury.” 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(a) (2008). SAMs may include housing the inmate in administrative detention and/or limiting certain privileges, including, but not limited to, correspondence, visiting, interviews with representatives of the news media, and use of the telephone, as is reasonably necessary to protect persons against the risk of acts of violence or terrorism. Id. SAMs can be imposed initially for only one year, but may be extended upon a sufficient showing of danger. § 501.3©.

Plaintiff states SAMs restrictions were imposed upon his arrival at ADX in February 2003, and they have been renewed on a yearly basis. (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff asserts he has been denied access to religious services and materials, has been limited in his access to an imam, has been denied access to educational and recreational services, and has been prevented from contacting the media. (Id. at 3–4.) Plaintiff states he has been prevented, since 2006 from writing to anyone other than immediate family and two of his aunts, the British Consulate, and U.S. Government agencies. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff also asserts he has been kept in harsher conditions than other inmates housed at ADX. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief. (Id. at 9.)

The test for determining a prisoner's rights:

It is long established that “[i]nmates . . . retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). An inmate’s exercise of constitutional rights is necessarily limited, however, “both from the fact of incarceration and from valid penological objectives—including deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security....

Because the religious rights of prisoners must be balanced against the interests inherent in prison administration, free exercise claims of prisoners are “judged under a ‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights.” O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349. Under this reasonableness test, “‘when a prison regulation impinges on inmates constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’”

The Court then writes:

Plaintiff’s complaint clearly states he is a practicing Sunni Muslim. (Compl. at 5.) The court cannot make an assessment of the sincerity of Plaintiff’s beliefs at this early stage. “The inquiry into the sincerity of a free-exercise plaintiff’s religious beliefs is almost exclusively a credibility assessment, . . . and therefore the issue of sincerity can rarely be determined on summary judgment,” let alone a motion to dismiss.

And,

Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding individual or group prayer are related to a sincerely-held religious belief. However, they do assert that “Plaintiff’s other miscellaneous allegations in support of his free exercise claim—concerning his inability to access unidentified correspondence courses, magazines and catalogs—do not show a substantial burden on a sincerely held religious belief . . .”

And then, the ruling for Reid:

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint clearly states he is being prevented from sufficiently studying the tenets of his religion by being prevented from taking part in correspondence courses, and by being denied access to religious materials and religious magazines. (Compl. at 5 [emphasis added].)

Although Plaintiff has not identified specific correspondence courses, religious materials, or religious magazines to which he has been denied access, he has stated they are related to the tenets of his religion. As in Kay, this court finds Plaintiff is not required to show that the items he claims he is prevented from obtaining are necessary to the practice of his religion. Accordingly, this court finds Plaintiff has alleged sufficient factual information that the denial of the materials has substantially burdened his sincerely-held religious beliefs. Therefore, the court proceeds to the question of whether there are legitimate penological interests that justify the impinging conduct.

The Government, says the Court, admits there is a ban on congregrate prayer at Supermax:

Defendants further assert that Plaintiff’s group prayer request is impracticable if “one considers the ‘group’ of fellow ADX inmates with whom Plaintiff could be allowed to pray during Jumah,” including co-conspirators in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. (Mot. to Dismiss at 7–8.) Defendants recite the history of one of these fellow inmates who “continued to assist his co-conspirators in their efforts to destroy the World Trade Center” during the period of time in which he was incarcerated...

The Court finds:

While the defendants may be able to show at a later time that there are legitimate penological interests that justify the complete ban on group prayer at the ADX, absent a more developed record, the court is unable to complete the four-factor balancing analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley. For this reason, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s freedom to congregate claim is properly denied.

Moving on to the correspondence courses, the Court rules:

Defendants have failed to address whether there are legitimate penological interests that justify Defendants’ refusal to allow Plaintiff access to correspondence courses, religious materials, and religious magazines. Therefore, it would be inappropriate for the court to dismiss the claim related to this allegation at this time.

A hearing was set for June 12, however, yesterday, the Government filed this pleading (pdf), stating that Reid's SAMS would end next week and it would not seek to renew them. (Reid has been under SAMS since his arrival at Supermax in 2003. They are good for a one year period and renewable. )

Undersigned counsel is authorized to represent that she has been advised that Plaintiff’s Special Administrative Measures, or SAMs, which are set to expire on June 17, 2009, will not be renewed.

In light of the non-renewal of Plaintiff’s SAMs, Defendants anticipate consulting with Plaintiff and promptly filing a motion to dismiss these proceedings—which challenge the SAMs.

Based on that pleading, the June 12 hearing was vacated. Shorter version: Score a round for Richard Reid, who filed all his papers in handwriting and pro se. He's getting off SAMS on June 17.

Another note: Both the Magistrate Judge and the District Court Judge are recent federal prosecutors, appointed to the bench while they were Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

And one last note: Richard Reid is another example of how the federal criminal courts can be used to try terror suspects. As I wrote here the the day of his sentencing,

Richard Reid's case proves we can provide even the most unlikable defendant charged with a heinous crime the same constitutional rights we provide to all defendants, and get a conviction and a harsh sentence fair and square. We should insist all such cases be tried this way.