(b) Shatzer's release back into the general prison population constitutes a break in Miranda custody. Lawful imprisonment imposed
upon conviction does not create the coercive pressures produced by investigative custody that justify Edwards. When previously incarcerated suspects are released back into the general prison population, they return to their accustomed surroundings and daily routine--
they regain the degree of control they had over their lives before the attempted interrogation.  Their continued detention is relatively disconnected from their prior unwillingness to cooperate in an investigation. The "inherently compelling pressures" of custodial interrogation
ended when Shatzer returned to his normal life.  Pp. 13-16.

When, unlike what happened in these three cases, a suspect has been released from his pretrial custody and has returned to his normal life for some time before the later attempted interrogation, there is little reason to think that his change of heart regarding interrogation without counsel has been coerced.  He has no longer been isolated. He has likely been able to seek advice from an attorney, family members, and friends. And he knows
from his earlier experience that he need only demand counsel to bring the interrogation to a halt; and that in­vestigative custody does not last indefinitely.  In these circumstances, it is far fetched to think that a police officer's asking the suspect whether he would like to waive his Miranda rights will any more "wear down the accused," Smith v. Illinois, 469 U. S. 91, 98 (1984) (per curiam), than did the first such request at the original attempted interrogation--which is of course not deemed
coercive. His change of heart is less likely attributable to "badgering" than it is to the fact that further deliberation in familiar surroundings has caused him to believe
(rightly or wrongly) that cooperating with the investiga­tion is in his interest. ­

We have never decided whether incarceration consti­tutes custody for Miranda purposes, and have indeed explicitly declined to address the issue.  See Perkins, 496
U. S., at 299.  See also Bradley v. Ohio, 497 U. S. 1011,1013 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certio­rari). Whether it does depends upon whether it exerts the coercive pressure that Miranda was designed to guard
against--the "danger of coercion [that] results from the interaction of custody and official interrogation."  Perkins, supra, at 297 (emphasis added).  To determine whether a
suspect was in Miranda custody we have asked whether"there is a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of move­ment' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 655 (1984); see also Stans-
bury v. California, 511 U. S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam).

This test, no doubt, is satisfied by all forms of incarcera­tion. Our cases make clear, however, that the freedom-of­-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a suffi­cient condition for Miranda custody.  We have declined to accord it "talismanic power," because Miranda is to be enforced "only in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 437 (1984).  Thus, the temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention in­ volved in a traffic stop or Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1 (1968), does not constitute Miranda custody. McCarty, supra, at 439-440.  See also Perkins, supra, at 296.

Here, we are addressing the interim period during
which a suspect was not interrogated, but was subject to a baseline set of restraints imposed pursuant to a prior conviction. Without minimizing the harsh realities of
incarceration, we think lawful imprisonment imposed upon conviction of a crime does not create the coercive pressures identified in Miranda. Interrogated suspects who have previously been con­victed of crime live in prison.  When they are released back into the general prison population, they return to
their accustomed surroundings and daily routine--they regain the degree of control they had over their lives prior to the interrogation. Sentenced prisoners, in contrast to the Miranda paradigm, are not isolated with their accusers. They live among other inmates, guards, and workers, and often can receive visitors and communicate with people on the outside by mail or telephone. Their detention, moreover, is relatively disconnected from their prior unwillingness to cooperate in an investi­gation. The former interrogator has no power to increase the duration of incarceration, which was determined at sentencing.

And even where the possibility of parole exists, the former interrogator has no apparent power to
decrease the time served. This is in stark contrast to the circumstances faced by the defendants in Edwards, Roberson, and Minnick, whose continued detention as suspects rested with those controlling their interrogation,
and who confronted the uncertainties of what final charges they would face, whether they would be convicted, and what sentence they would receive.