A big problem with the Obama administration’s approach to the Pakistani Taliban is that so far they have proffered only sticks and no carrots have been implemented. Last summer Washington prevailed on the Pakistani military to launch a campaign against the TTP in South Waziristan. It was carried out with much brutality and involved targeting members of the Mahsud tribe in general. South Waziristan is now under virtual military rule, many of its markets burned down, and its inhabitants subjected to constant checkpoint searches, as former ambassador Ayaz Wazir just described the situation. The displaced members of the Mahsud tribe are being threatened with death by the Taliban if they yield to Pakistani imploring to return to their homes, now under Islamabad’s military rule.
That is, in US military terms counter-insurgency would involve taking territory, clearing it of insurgents, holding it in the long term so as to reassure local populations they are safe, and then building an infrastructure of government services and a thriving economy. The Pakistani military has just taken and cleared. It isn’t providing enough security to allow the Mahsud to return to their homes. Although the US is dedicating monies for the “build” portion, it is not reaching South Waziristan at the moment, and take, clear– without the “hold” and “build” elements– is just brutal military.
More theories here.
Apparently, it's not that easy to fully detonate a bomb.
However, it also shows how difficult it can be to actually accomplish a full explosion. Producing a complete detonation has been the most important hurdle for a number of failed terrorist bombers, including Christmas Day bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, shoe bomber Richard Reid, the bombers of the June 30, 2007, Glasgow Airport attacks, and the bombers of the July 21, 2005, attacks against the London public transit system. While all of these attackers in some way initiated their bombs, none of them caused the explosions -- or the accompanying devastation and loss of life -- that they intended.
Accomplishing catastrophic effects is difficult because the detonation of a large explosion begins with a very small ignition and progressively (though rapidly) grows into something much bigger. It happens in an instant, but it happens by design and in sequence. Done properly, each step in the chain reaction occurs because of a deliberate plan to build upon the energy released by the preceding step, culminating in the explosion of the main charge. Trying to explode a propane cylinder with a firecracker, as the Times Square attacker did, is a bit like trying to topple a refrigerator with a domino.
As for a connection to al Qaeda, as I mentioned the other day, this was significantly different in that there was no suicide bomber. The Times Square guy fled the scene to escape injury.
But the Times Square incident is different in one critical respect from the four examples of failed jihadi bombings above: Whereas the other attacks were planned as suicides, the assailant seems to have intended to survive his bombing, as demonstrated by the empty Nissan Pathfinder left at the scene. The aspiration to martyrdom associated with al Qaeda and similar movements does not appear to have motivated the bomber in this instance. The reasons for this key difference are as yet unclear.
Still sounds like a loner plan to me.
Taken altogether, the dubious claims of international responsibility, the defective conceptualization of the attack, the nefarious intent, the choice of target, and the apparent preference for survival indicate inexperienced, enthusiastic, unsure, and isolated actor(s), trying more than anything else to make a political statement to American and global audiences.
