This might work as a Supreme Court opinion that can disagree with precedent. But Judge Vinson is just a District Court judge. And if you pair Justice Thomas’s dissent in Raich with Judge Vinson’s opinion today, you realize the problem: Judge Vinson is reasoning that existing law must be a particular way because he thinks it should be that way as a matter of first principles, not because the relevant Supreme Court doctrine actually points that way. Remember that in Raich, the fact that the majority opinion gave the federal government the power to “regulate virtually anything” was a reason for Justice Thomas to dissent. In Judge Vinson’s opinion, however, the fact that the government’s theory gave the federal government the power to “regulate virtually anything” was a reason it had to be inconsistent with precedent.

Obviously, I’m not arguing that Judge Vinson was bound by Justice Thomas’s dissent. Rather, my point is that Judge Vinson should not have used a first principle to trump existing Supreme Court caselaw when that principle may not be consistent with existing caselaw. Either Justice Thomas is wrong or Judge Vinson is wrong, and Judge Vinson was not making a persuasive legal argument when he followed the first principle instead of the cases. Because Judge Vinson is bound by Supreme Court precedent, I would think he should have applied the cases.

Ironically, Judge Vinson claimed that it was not in his power to recognize the individual mandate as constitutional as it would require the Supreme Court to make such a "change" in constitutional law:

I am required to interpret this law as the Supreme Court presently defines it.

Except of course, when he does not want to. For example, on the meaning of the Necessary and Proper clause. Judge Vinson mentions U.S. v. Comstock, while purporting to apply it. Here is what Comstock said about the Necessary and Proper clause:

We have since made clear that, in determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power. Sabri v. United States , 541 U. S. 600, 605 (2004) (using term “means-ends rationality” to describe the necessary relationship); ibid. (upholding Congress’ “authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause” to enact a criminal statute in furtherance of the federal power granted by the Spending Clause); see Gonzales v. Raich , 545 U. S. 1, 22 (2005) (holding that because “Congress had a rational basis” for concluding that a statute implements Commerce Clause power, the statute falls within the scope of congressional “authority to ‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper’ to ‘regulate Commerce … among the several States’ ” (ellipsis in original)); see also United States v. Lopez , 514 U. S. 549, 557 (1995) ; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc. , 452 U. S. 264, 276 (1981).

Of course, as Chief Justice Marshall stated, a federal statute, in addition to being authorized by Art. I, §8, must also “not [be] prohibited” by the Constitution. McCulloch, supra, at 421. But as we have already stated, the present statute’s validity under provisions of the Constitution other than the Necessary and Proper Clause is an issue that is not before us. Under the question presented, the relevant inquiry is simply “whether the means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power” or under other powers that the Constitution grants Congress the authority to implement. Gonzales , supra, at 37 (S calia, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting United States v. Darby , 312 U. S. 100, 121 (1941) ).

We have also recognized that the Constitution “addresse[s]” the “choice of means” “primarily … to the judgment of Congress. If it can be seen that the means adopted are really calculated to attain the end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to which they conduce to the end, the closeness of the relationship between the means adopted and the end to be attained, are matters for congressional determination alone.” Burroughs v. United States , 290 U. S. 534, 547–548 (1934). See also Lottery Case , 188 U. S. 321, 355 (1903) (“[T]he Constitution … . leaves to Congress a large discretion as to the means that may be employed in executing a given power”); Morrison , supra, at 607 (applying a “presumption of constitutionality” when examining the scope of Congressional power); McCulloch, supra, at 410, 421.

(Emphasis supplied.) Vinson ignores all of this and creates his own unique standard for review of the exercise of the Necessary and Proper clause power:

[T]he Necessary and Proper Clause vests Congress with the power and authority to exercise means which may not in and of themselves fall within an enumerated power, to accomplish ends that must be within an enumerated power. Although Congress’ authority to act in furtherance of those ends is unquestionably broad, there are nevertheless “restraints upon the Necessary and Proper Clause authority.” See Raich, supra, 545 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).

[. . .] The Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be utilized to “pass laws for the accomplishment of objects” that are not within Congress’ enumerated powers. As the previous analysis of the defendants’ Commerce Clause argument reveals, the individual mandate is neither within the letter nor the spirit of the Constitution. To uphold that provision via application of the Necessary and Proper Clause would authorize Congress to reach and regulate far beyond the currently established “outer limits” of the Commerce Clause and effectively remove all limits on federal power. [. . .T]he individual mandate falls outside the boundary of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority and cannot be reconciled with a limited government of enumerated powers. By definition, it cannot be “proper.”

This reasoning reads the Necessary and Proper clause out of the Constitution and is blatant conflict with existing Supreme Court precedent. As Vinson himself writes, the Congress can exercise power under the Necessary and Proper clause that "may not in and of themselves fall within an enumerated power, to accomplish ends that must be within an enumerated power." Vinson accepts that the ends of the ACA fall within the enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause, so what precisely makes this exercise of the Necessary and Proper power by the Congress unconstitutional? Vinson waves his hand at this issue:

The individual mandate is outside Congress’ Commerce Clause power, and it cannot be otherwise authorized by an assertion of power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. It is not Constitutional.

But the exercise of the Necessary and Proper clause power, as Vinson himself writes, need not "in and of themselves fall within an enumerated power, to accomplish ends that must be within an enumerated power." Vinson's reasoning makes no sense.

In the end, Professor Kerr puts it well:

As Justice Thomas put it, Congress can regulate virtually anything. Judge Vinson says that this cannot be the law because it would make the federal government too powerful. But Judge Vinson does not consult existing doctrine before declaring the principle, and that’s the problem: If you take existing doctrine seriously, it readily fits the mandate under the Necessary and Proper clause.

Vinson's deliberate flouting of centuries of Supreme Court precedent is the real story of this decision.

Speaking for me only