It was a case that was "all talk and no action" built on circumstantial evidence:
The Government’s case is built largely of circumstantial evidence. While this
evidence could certainly lead a rational factfinder to conclude that “something fishy” was
going on, it does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendants reached a concrete agreement to forcibly oppose the United States Government. “Although circumstantial evidence alone can support a conviction, there are times that it amounts to only a reasonable speculation and not to sufficient evidence.” Newman v. Metrish, 543 F.3d 793, 796 (6th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases); see also Wexler, 838 F.2d at 90(“The elements of a conspiracy may be proven entirely by circumstantial evidence, but each element of the offense must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). This is one of those times. The Court is limited by what inferences reason will allow it to draw.
More quotes:
While it is often necessary to make certain inferences from circumstantial evidence in conspiracy cases, the plethora of inferences the Government asks this Court to make are in excess of what the law allows. But, the Government crosses the line from inference to pure speculation a number of times in this case. Charges built on speculation cannot be sustained.
and
The prosecution is not “free to roam at large -- to shift its theory of criminality so as to take advantage of each passing vicissitude of the trial . . . .” Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 768 (1962). If the Government now admits that the plan alleged in Count I of the Indictment did not exist, then Defendants must be acquitted. The inescapable conclusion of such a tactic is that the Government recognizes that its
proofs at trial failed to establish the plan described in the Indictment, so it is attempting
to formulate an alternative theory of criminal liability.
The Government appears to be attempting to broaden the charges contained in Count I; yet, “after an indictment has been returned its charges may not be broadened through amendment except by the grand jury itself.” Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215-16 (1960). This is because defendants are entitled to have fair notice of the criminal charges against them
so that they can prepare a defense. United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 935 (6th Cir. 2004).
Random points of law from the opinion:
“[C]onjecture and surmise regarding what a defendant may have intended or known is insufficient to support a conviction” in a conspiracy case. United States v. Coppin, 1 F. App’x 283, 291 (6th Cir. 2001).
....While a defendant’s participation in a conspiracy may certainly be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, Paige, 470 F.3d at 609, to sustain the seditious conspiracy charge fashioned by the Government, the Court would have to “pil[e] inference upon inference.” Ingram, 360 U.S. at 681 (1959)
...What the Government has shown, instead of a concrete agreement and plan to forcibly oppose the authority of the Government, is that most -- if not all -- of these Defendants held strong anti-Government sentiments. But the Court must not guess about what Defendants intended to do with their animosity. “The government is required to present evidence of the defendant’s intent, knowledge of and agreement to join a conspiracy.” Coppin, 1 F. App’x at 291. “Absent such evidence, the government’s case will not succeed merely because there is something ‘fishy’ about the
defendant’s conduct.” Id.
...the Court would need to engage in conjecture and surmise to find sufficient evidence that Defendants “shared a ‘unity of purpose’, the intent to achieve a common goal, and an agreement to work together toward the goal.” “In the absence of evidence of the[ ] essential [conspiracy] factors, a guilty verdict on a conspiracy charge cannot be sustained.”
