Q: Was the American antiwar movement important to Hanoi's victory?

A:  It was essential to our strategy.  Support of the war from our rear was completely secure  while the American rear was vulnerable.  Every day our leadership would listen to world news over the radio at 9 a.m.  to follow the growth of the American antiwar movement.  Visits to Hanoi by people like Jane Fonda, and former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and ministers gave us confidence  that we should hold on  in the face of battlefield reverses. We were elated when Jane Fonda, wearing a red Vietnamese dress, said at a press conference that she was ashamed of American actions in the war and that she would struggle along with us.

Q: Did the Politburo pay attention to these visits?

A: Keenly.

And helps even more if you had Uncle Walter making false claims....

Tet was designed to influence American public opinion. We would attack poorly defended parts of South Vietnam cities during a holiday and a truce when few South Vietnamese troops would be on duty. Before the main attack, we would entice American units to advance close to the borders, away from the cities. By attacking all South Vietnam's major cities, we would spread out our forces and neutralize the impact of American firepower. Attacking on a broad front, we would lose some battles but win others. We used local forces nearby each target to frustrate discovery of our plans. Small teams, like the one which attacked the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, would be sufficient. It was a guerrilla strategy of hit-and-run raids. [lloks like a re-writing of history with the benefit of hindsight]

Q: What about the results?

A: Our losses were staggering and a complete surprise;. Giap later told me that Tet had been a military defeat, though we had gained the planned political advantages when Johnson agreed to negotiate and did not run for re-election. The second and third waves in May and September were, in retrospect, mistakes. Our forces in the South were nearly wiped out by all the fighting in 1968. It took us until 1971 to re-establish our presence, but we had to use North Vietnamese troops as local guerrillas. If the American forces had not begun to withdraw under Nixon in 1969, they could have punished us severely. We suffered badly in 1969 and 1970 as it was.

spectre US, specter [ˈspɛktə]
n

1. (Spirituality, New Age, Astrology & Self-help / Alternative Belief Systems) a ghost; phantom; apparition
   
2. a mental image of something unpleasant or menacing the spectre of redundancy

Those names on the list aren't on TV spouting their hatred.

So these rightwing nuts committing actual/real acts of violence don't count, because they're not on TV, as opposed to your examples, which include a comedian making a joke, a union protester knocking a phone away from his face, and angry, anonymous voicemail messages left at a winger group?  Uhmmmm, ... not that it matters, but you do realize that only 2 of your examples were "on TV" - the two comedians making jokes.

So rightwing murderers actually committing murder are worse than left-wing comedians telling offensive jokes.

Heh.

None are Tea Party members, though some may have been members of groups like:

Code Pink

You didn't ask for acts of violence from Tea party members, Jim.  You asked for examples of rightwing violence.

How about some examples of Right Wingers doing things like I have shown??

BTW - You have absolutely no idea whether these guys were Tea Party members, but your claim that they "may have been" members of groups like Code Pink is funny.  Yep - because so many Code Pink members are "Sovereign Citizen" members, anti-abortion activists and trying to a$$asinate President Obama.

Heh.

Today/tonight is my cousin's wedding...I know he's sh*tting a brick right now.  Dead man walking, dead man walking here  

But since you asked, this should get you started with why a minority of Republicans were able to filibuster even the moderate ACA:

With the Republican minority in the Senate vowing to filibuster any bill that they did not support, requiring a cloture vote to end debate, 60 votes would be necessary to get passage in the Senate. At the start of the 111th Congress, Democrats had only 58 votes; the Senate seat in Minnesota that would be won by Al Franken was still undergoing a recount, and Arlen Specter was still a Republican.

To reach 60 votes, negotiations were undertaken to satisfy the demands of moderate Democrats, and to try to bring aboard several Republican senators; particular attention was given to Bob Bennett, Mike Enzi, Chuck Grassley, and Olympia Snowe. Negotiations continued even after July 7--when Franken was sworn into office, and by which time Specter had switched parties--because of disagreements over the substance of the bill, which was still being drafted in committee, and because moderate Democrats hoped to win bipartisan support. However, on August 25, before the bill could come up for a vote, Ted Kennedy--a long-time advocate for healthcare reform--died, depriving Democrats of their 60th vote. Before the seat was filled, attention was drawn to Senator Snowe because of her vote in favor of the draft bill in the Finance Committee on October 15, however she explicitly stated that this did not mean she would support the final bill. Paul Kirk was appointed as Senator Kennedy's temporary replacement on September 24.

Following the Finance Committee vote, negotiations turned to the demands of moderate Democrats to finalize their support, whose votes would be necessary to break the Republican filibuster. Majority leader Harry Reid focused on satisfying the centrist members of the Democratic caucus until the holdouts narrowed down to Joe Lieberman of Connecticut, an independent who caucused with Democrats, and Ben Nelson of Nebraska. Lieberman, despite intense negotiations in search of a compromise by Reid, refused to support a public option; a concession granted only after Lieberman agreed to commit to voting for the bill if the provision was not included, even though it had majority support in Congress. There was debate among supporters of the bill about the importance of the public option, although the vast majority of supporters concluded that it was a minor part of the reform overall, and that congressional Democrats' fight for it won various concessions, including conditional waivers allowing states to set up state-based public options such as Vermont's Green Mountain Care.

With every other Democrat now in favor and every other Republican now overtly opposed, the White House and Reid moved on to addressing Senator Nelson's concerns in order to win filibuster-proof support for the bill; they had by this point concluded that "it was a waste of time dealing with [Snowe]" because, after her vote for the draft bill in the Finance Committee, Snowe had come under intense pressure from the Republican Senate leadership who opposed reform...

On December 23, the Senate voted 60-39 to end debate on the bill: a cloture vote to end the filibuster by opponents. The bill then passed by a vote of 60-39 on December 24, 2009, with all Democrats and two independents voting for, and all Republicans voting against (except for Jim Bunning, who did not vote).[101] The bill was endorsed by the AMA and AARP.