War is exactly what ISIS wants. Why give it to them? From an article by Paul Waldman of the American Prospect in The Week:

ISIS's brutality is beyond question, as is the threat they pose to countries in the Middle East. But here in America, so many act as if there's also no question that they pose a threat to us. That's despite the fact that they haven't tried to launch any terrorist attacks against the United States, and the four Americans they've killed were only those who had the terrible fortune to fall into their clutches.

That isn't to say that they might not one day try to attack America more directly, but believing that, unless we launch a full-scale war in Syria, ISIS will invade the United States and we'll "all get killed back here at home," as Sen. Lindsey Graham so memorably put it, is not the mark of a person in full possession of his or her faculties.

On a deeper level, the new issue of Foreign Policy Magazine has a very long and sobering article, by Audrey Kurth Kronin, "ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group: Why Counterterrorism Won’t Stop the Latest Jihadist Threat", that argues counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism measures won't defeat ISIS, but war is just folly. Kronin is a professor and the Director the International Security Program at George Mason University.

It's too long to hit all the points, but here are some that stood out to me:

ISIS is now led by well-trained, capable former Iraqi military leaders who know U.S. techniques and habits because Washington helped train them. And after routing Iraqi army units and taking their U.S.-supplied equipment, ISIS is now armed with American tanks, artillery, armored Humvees, and mine-resistant vehicles.


...The pursuit of a full-fledged military campaign would exhaust U.S. resources and offer little hope of obtaining the objective. Wars pursued at odds with political reality cannot be won. 


There are no good options. ISIS is not a U.S. problem. It's a problem for countries in the region ISIS wants to conquer.

ISIS is not merely an American problem. The wars in Iraq and Syria involve not only regional players but also major global actors, such as Russia, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states. Washington must stop behaving as if it can fix the region’s problems with military force and instead resurrect its role as a diplomatic superpower.

Responding to ISIS as if they are merely terrorists is the wrong approach because ISIS is not just a terrorist group. It may not be a full-fledged state, but that's its goal and it's making headway. And it is not Al Qaida, they have very different goals.

As ISIS has grown, its goals and intentions have become clearer. Al Qaeda conceived of itself as the vanguard of a global insurgency mobilizing Muslim communities against secular rule. ISIS, in contrast, seeks to control territory and create a “pure” Sunni Islamist state governed by a brutal interpretation of sharia; to immediately obliterate the political borders of the Middle East that were created by Western powers in the twentieth century; and to position itself as the sole political, religious, and military authority over all of the world’s Muslims.

What can be done? Treat ISIS like other states that are threats to international stability.

ISIS is not a nuclear power, but the group represents a threat to international stability equivalent to that posed by North Korea. It should be treated no less seriously.


... The major powers and regional players must agree to stiffen the international arms embargo currently imposed on ISIS, enact more vigorous sanctions against the group, conduct joint border patrols, provide more aid for displaced persons and refugees, and strengthen UN peacekeeping missions in countries that border Iraq and Syria. Although some of these tools overlap with counterterrorism, they should be put in the service of a strategy for fighting an enemy more akin to a state actor.

There's also the matter of ISIS' wealth:

Of course, like terrorist groups, ISIS also takes hostages, demanding tens of millions of dollars in ransom payments. But more important to the group’s finances is a wide-ranging extortion racket that targets owners and producers in ISIS territory, taxing everything from small family farms to large enterprises such as cell-phone service providers, water delivery companies, and electric utilities. The enterprise is so complex that the U.S. Treasury has declined to estimate ISIS’ total assets and revenues, but ISIS is clearly a highly diversified enterprise whose wealth dwarfs that of any terrorist organization. And there is little evidence that Washington has succeeded in reducing the group’s coffers. 


A "surge" like the one Bush used in Iraq would not work either.

the logic of U.S. counterinsurgency does not suit the struggle against ISIS. The United States cannot win the hearts and minds of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, because the Maliki government has already lost them. The Shiite-dominated Iraqi government has so badly undercut its own political legitimacy that it might be impossible to restore it. Moreover, the United States no longer occupies Iraq. Washington can send in more troops, but it cannot lend legitimacy to a government it no longer controls. ISIS is less an insurgent group fighting against an established government than one party in a conventional civil war between a breakaway territory and a weak central state.

Why war is not the answer:

Putting more U.S. troops on the ground would be counterproductive, entangling the United States in an unwinnable war that could go on for decades. The United States cannot rebuild the Iraqi state or determine the outcome of the Syrian civil war. Frustrating as it might be to some, when it comes to military action, Washington should stick to a realistic course that recognizes the limitations of U.S. military force as a long-term solution.


The warmongers need to be ignored. War is the wrong response. It will please ISIS, we won't win and it will bleed us dry -- in money and human life. We should limit our military efforts to containment, which realistically, is all that can be accomplished:

The sobering fact is that the United States has no good military options in its fight against ISIS. Neither counterterrorism, nor counterinsurgency, nor conventional warfare is likely to afford Washington a clear-cut victory against the group.

For the time being, at least, the policy that best matches ends and means and that has the best chance of securing U.S. interests is one of offensive containment: combining a limited military campaign with a major diplomatic and economic effort to weaken ISIS and align the interests of the many countries that are threatened by the group’s advance.

How to do that?


The United States must stay committed to fighting ISIS over the long term in a manner that matches ends with means, calibrating and improving U.S. efforts to contain the group by moving past outmoded forms of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency while also resisting pressure to cross the threshold into full-fledged war.

Over time, the successful containment of ISIS might open up better policy options. But for the foreseeable future, containment is the best policy that the United States can pursue.

The media can run all the polls it wants. A decision to go to war should not be based on polls, especially when most Americans don't understand a thing about ISIS or what motivates them and their responses are knee-jerk reactions to the horror of the beheading videos. The videos are a propaganda technique and recruitment tool. ISIS knows they push everyone's buttons.

Its brutality—videotaped beheadings, mass executions—is designed to intimidate foes and suppress dissent. Revulsion among Muslims at such cruelty might eventually undermine ISIS. But for the time being, Washington’s focus on ISIS’ savagery only helps the group augment its aura of strength.


The violent videos gather a lot more recruits than al Qaida's overly pious videos:

ISIS, in contrast, offers a very different message for young men, and sometimes women. The group attracts followers yearning for not only religious righteousness but also adventure, personal power, and a sense of self and community. And, of course, some people just want to kill— and ISIS welcomes them, too. The group’s brutal violence attracts attention, demonstrates dominance, and draws people to the action. 


...In short, ISIS offers short-term, primitive gratification. It does not radicalize people in ways that can be countered by appeals to logic. Teenagers are attracted to the group without even understanding what it is, and older fighters just want to be associated with ISIS’ success. Compared with fighting al Qaeda’s relatively austere message, Washington has found it much harder to counter ISIS’ more visceral appeal, perhaps for a very simple reason: a desire for power, agency, and instant results also pervades American culture. 


One last quote, on the resources we've devoted to counterterrorism since 9/11 and the threat of attacks by lone or loony wolves at home, who are ISIS-inspired but unlikely to be directed by ISIS:

In the post-9/11 era, the United States has built up a trillion-dollar infrastructure of intelligence, law enforcement, and military operations aimed at al Qaeda and its affiliates. According to a 2010 investigation by The Washington Post, some 263 U.S. government organizations were created or reorganized in response to the 9/11 attacks, including the Department of Homeland Security, the National Counterterrorism Center, and the Transportation Security Administration.

Each year, U.S. intelligence agencies produce some 50,000 reports on terrorism. Fifty-one U.S. federal organizations and military commands track the flow of money to and from terrorist networks. This structure has helped make terrorist attacks on U.S. soil exceedingly rare.