As Lee's forces spread out throughout southern Pennsylvania south of the Susquehanna River on what was basically a large scale foraging expedition, Meade's plan was to take up a position at Pipe Creek, MD (near Taneytown) to shield Washington and Baltimore, and then intercept Lee as he turned south.

At the time, because J.E.B. Stuart and the rebel cavalry were busy riding wide around the east flank of the Union army, Lee had absolutely no idea that Meade was even north of the Potomac River. That lack of knowledge proved an auspicious harbinger to the subsequent events which followed.

Gettysburg was in many respects an accidental battle, and came about because Confederate Gen. Heth's infantry division accidentally collided with Gen. Buford's Union cavalry division -- Meade's advance guard -- just to the west of the town on July 1, 1863.

Heth advanced, expecting the Yankee cavalry to scatter rather than face an full infantry assault, but Buford staked out a battle line and resisted, causing Heth's division to double back upon itself along the Cumberland Road. Both generals then called for reinforcements, and the battle was quickly joined as two entire Confederate corps answered Heth's plea, while the Union XI Corps moved forward to support Buford.

While Gen. Meade was naturally cautious, he was also very good at improvisation. Once he got word where the rebels were concentrating, he quickly moved the entire Union Army north to Gettysburg from Pipe Creek in a matter of hours, and occupied the hills just to the immediate south of the town.

Meanwhile, Lee ordered his entire Army of Northern Virginia to also concentrate at Gettysburg, thinking that he'd avail himself of the opportunity to crush an isolated Union XI Corps that was too far out front for its own good, and not realizing until it was much too late that he actually was about to collide with the entire Federal army.

After two days of hard fighting on the right and left flanks, with Meade's lines bent back but otherwise showing no signs of breaking, Lee uncharacteristically lost patience and threw caution to the wind. He ordered a massed attack on the Union center, committing his last reserves in Gen. George Pickett's division.

Unfortunately for him -- or more correctly, the men he ordered to make the attack -- Meade had correctly surmised that Lee was about to hit his center, and had reinforced his lines there accordingly in considerable depth.

So, rather than hitting a weakened center line and splitting the Army of the Potomac in two as Lee had fully expected, "Pickett's Charge instead marched headlong into a huge Union buzzsaw and was quickly cut to pieces, suffering over 50% casualties in a matter of 45 minutes.

Gettysburg is one of the most fascinating battles in American history, both as the war's turning point and for the sheer carnage which both armies inflicted upon one another. Over 51,000 men on both sides fell over the course of its three days of fighting.

While as I noted earlier, Gettysburg represented Lee's low point, I've always felt that Gen. Meade never quite got the credit he deserved for delivering what proved to be a very crippling blow to the Confederate cause.

In fact, President Lincoln was initially perturbed that Meade had let Lee get away after the failure of Pickett's Charge, perhaps not realizing at the time that the Union Army had been severely mauled as well in the battle as well, losing nearly one-quarter of their own numbers.

But the Union could replenish those losses fairly rapidly, while the Confederacy could not. Lee's forces at Gettysburg represented the largest army the Confederates ever put into the field in four years of war. One-third of that army was lost in the ensuing battle.

That's what one man's hubris can do to a cause or country, if not properly curbed. Military history holds a lot of lessons for us, particularly as to how to act (or not act, as the case may be) under pressure and duress.

Republicans are displaying many of the same characteristics as Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia during the Gettysburg campaign -- namely, a personal disdain for their opponents, overconfidence in their own capabilities, and an appalling lack of concern while treading on unfamiliar ground.