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Material Resource Statute: Training and Personnel

Washington Post reporters Dan Eggan and Steve Fainaru today write that prosecutors are using the provision in the 1996 Anti-Terrorism law that prohibits providing material services to a terrorist organization as their key strategy in terror cases, including those of John Walker Lindh, the Buffalo Six, Oregon Six and James Ujaama in Seattle.

Eggan and Fainaru report:

"Many defense attorneys and civil liberties advocates contend the law is worded so broadly that even unknowing contributions to groups the government labels terrorists can be prosecuted. Two federal judges in Los Angeles, in separate cases, have declared all or parts of the law unconstitutional."

"David Cole, a Georgetown University law professor who has participated in a legal challenge to the statute, maintains that the material-support ban is dangerously vague and could easily be used against people engaged in lawful activity."

"This law is so broad it would make it a crime for a Quaker to send a book on Ghandi's theory of nonviolence to the leader of a terrorist group," Cole said. "It essentially resurrects the guilt-by-association philosophy of the McCarthy era."

"Lee A. Albert, a law professor at the University of Buffalo, said the Lackawanna case will be a significant test of the statute's reach. Even though the defendants may have accepted training, he said, there is no public evidence that they actually provided "material support" to al Qaeda."

We believe the law does not encompass an individual who volunteers for military training. We don't think that constitutes providing material support or resources or that it fits withing the definition of providing "personnel" or "training." We think there is a big difference between obtaining training and providing training, and providing one person, namely one's self, and providing "personnel."

See Section 9-91.100 of the U.S. Attorneys' Manual instructing prosecutors how to apply the law:

"9-91.100 Proscribed Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B"

"As part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, Congress passed a comprehensive ban on the provision of "material support or resources" to entities that are designated by the United States Government as "foreign terrorist organizations." See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. This ban includes a prohibition on the provision of "personnel" or "training" to such organizations. This section of the United States Attorneys' Manual sets forth the official policy of the Department of Justice on the § 2339B prohibitions relating to "personnel" and "training."

Here is what it says as to personnel:

"It is the policy of the Department that a person may be prosecuted under § 2339B for providing "personnel" to a designated foreign terrorist organization if and only if that person has knowingly provided the organization with one or more individuals to work under the foreign entity's direction or control. Individuals who act independently of the designated foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals and objectives are not working under its direction or control and may not be prosecuted for providing "personnel" to a designated foreign terrorist organization. Only individuals who have subordinated themselves to the foreign terrorist organization, i.e., those acting as full-time or part-time employees or otherwise taking orders from the entity, are under its direction or control."

"NOTE: There are two different ways of providing "personnel" to a designated foreign terrorist organization: 1) by working under the direction or control of the organization; or 2) by recruiting another to work under its direction or control. The statute encompasses both methods, so long as the requisite direction or control is present."

"This policy also applies to attempts and conspiracies, i.e., a person may be prosecuted under § 2339B for attempting or conspiring to provide personnel to a designated foreign terrorist organization if and only if that person has knowingly attempted or conspired to provide the organization with one or more individuals to work under its direction or control. The reasons behind this policy are as follows:First, the most natural interpretation of a statute proscribing the provision of "personnel" "to" a designated organization is that it does not reach independent actors. Rather, it reaches those who have provided employees or individuals who function like employees to serve the designated group and work at its command. See Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 878 (1989) (defining "personnel" as "a body of persons usu. employed (as in a factory, office, or organization")). ...

As to "training", the same section of the U.S. Attorney's Manual continues with:

"Section 2339B also prohibits knowingly providing any "training" to a designated foreign terrorist organization, regardless of the subject matter of the training. The verb "train" is commonly understood to mean: "to teach so as to make fit, qualified, or proficient. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1251 (1989). "

"It is the prosecutive policy of the Department that a person may be prosecuted under § 2339B for providing "training" to a designated foreign terrorist organization if and only if that person has knowingly provided instruction to the organization designed to impart one or more specific skills. This policy also applies to attempts and conspiracies, i.e., a person may be prosecuted under § 2339B for attempting or conspiring to provide training to a designated foreign terrorist organization if and only if that person has knowingly attempted or conspired to provide instruction to the organization designed to impart one or more specific skills."

The Judge in the John Walker Lindh case and the Magistrate Judge in the Buffalo Six case have upheld the application of the statute in those cases. The Ninth Circuit, where the Oregon Six will be tried, takes a different view. As Timothy Edgar, legislative counsel for the ACLU, told Egan and Fainaru, "There are a lot of unsettled legal questions with this statute, so I don't know why the government feels the need to rely on it in these cases. We already have in the law the concept that if you get together with other people and plot to kill, you have committed a crime. . . . All this law does is relieve the government of its obligation to prove a connection to terrorism."

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