So here is a link (pdf) to the Executive Summary of the 9/11 Commission Report. But don;t worry, I'll show you all the parts about the New Kids and the Tall One and the Horny One rght here. The "essence of the spirit," if you will. You don't have to actually read it.

A Shock, Not a Surprise

The 9/11 attacks were a shock, but they should not have come as a surprise. Islamist extremists had given plenty of warning that they meant to kill Americans indiscriminately and in large numbers. Although Usama Bin Ladin himself would not emerge as a signal threat until the late 1990s, the threat of Islamist terrorism grew over the decade.

My bold. Usama is the Tall One. Became a threat in the late 1990s. So 1996? 97? 98? 99? Let's see what we can find out. I think I can pinpoint this now:

Until 1997, the U.S. intelligence community viewed Bin Ladin as a financier of terrorism, not as a terrorist leader. In February 1998, Usama Bin Ladin and four others issued a self-styled fatwa, publicly declaring that it was God's decree that every Muslim should try his utmost to kill any American, military or civilian, anywhere in the world, because of American "occupation" of Islam's holy places and aggression against Muslims. In August 1998, Bin Ladin's group, al Qaeda, carried out near-simultaneous truck bomb attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.The attacks killed 224 people, including 12 Americans,and wounded thousands more.

1998. February or August. Take your pick. You would be "reasonably accurate" in either case. So let's see how many times in 2 years did the New Kids "capture" Osama (Usama or the Tall One to you) according to the "spirit" of the "essence" of the "reasonably accurate" process of "dramatization."

Well how about this?

During 2000, President Bill Clinton and his advisers renewed diplomatic efforts to get Bin Ladin expelled from Afghanistan. They also renewed secret efforts with some of the Taliban's opponents--the Northern Alliance--to get enough intelligence to attack Bin Ladin directly. Diplomatic efforts centered on the new military government in Pakistan, and they did not succeed.The efforts with the Northern Alliance revived an inconclusive and secret debate about whether the United States should take sides in Afghanistan's civil war and support the Taliban's enemies. The CIA also produced a plan to improve intelligence collection on al Qaeda, including the use of a small, unmanned airplane with a video camera, known as the Predator.

After the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole, evidence accumulated that it had been launched by al Qaeda operatives, but without confirmation that Bin Ladin had given the order.The Taliban had earlier been warned that it would be held responsible for another Bin Ladin attack on the United States.The CIA described its findings as a "preliminary judgment"; President Clinton and his chief advisers told us they were waiting for a conclusion before deciding whether to take military action.The military alternatives remained unappealing to them.

Wait a sec, here we are in December 2000 and Donnie Wahlberg has not captured bin Laden yet? But I thought the "spirit" of the "essence" of the drama... ."

The transition to the new Bush administration in late 2000 and early 2001took place with the Cole issue still pending. President George W. Bush and his chief advisers accepted that al Qaeda was responsible for the attack on the Cole, but did not like the options available for a response.

Did not like the options available for response? Whatsa matter you sissy horndog (I know I know) . . . So Donnie Wahlberg has to do a "catch and release" cuz you're a wimp! A-ha! The "spirit" of the . . . huh . . . What's that? It was Commander Codpiece that did not like "the options available?" . . . Hmmmmm.

Yeah but what about this?

During the spring and summer of 2001, U.S. intelligence agencies received a stream of warnings that al Qaeda planned, as one report put it, "something very,very,very big."Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet told us,"The system was blinking red."

What about that? Oh Bush was President then too.

But look what Bush did!!

Although Bin Ladin was determined to strike in the United States, as President Clinton had been told and President Bush was reminded in a Presidential Daily Brief article briefed to him in August 2001, the specific threat information pointed overseas. Numerous precautions were taken overseas. Domestic agencies were not effectively mobilized. The threat did not receive national media attention comparable to the millennium alert.

While the United States continued disruption efforts around the world, its emerging strategy to eliminate the al Qaeda threat was to include an enlarged covert action program in Afghanistan, as well as diplomatic strategies for Afghanistan and Pakistan.The process culminated during the summer of 2001 in a draft presidential directive and arguments about the Predator aircraft, which was soon to be deployed with a missile of its own, so that it might be used to attempt to kill Bin Ladin or his chief lieutenants.

At a September 4 meeting, President Bush's chief advisers approved the draft directive of the strategy and endorsed the concept of arming the Predator. This directive on the al Qaeda strategy was awaiting President Bush's signature on September 11, 2001.

Hey, these things take time. It's not like somebody's hair was on fire or anything.

I mean think about this:

As late as September 4, 2001, Richard Clarke, the White House staffer long responsible for counterterrorism policy coordination, asserted that the government had not yet made up its mind how to answer the question:"Is al Qaida a big deal?"
A week later came the answer.

I blame the Clenis. And that my dear friends, is the spirit and the essence of "dramatization." All kidding aside, what makes ABC's effort so clearly dishonest is THIS section of the Executive Summary:

Lack of Military Options

In response to the request of policymakers, the military prepared an array of limited strike options for attacking Bin Ladin and his organization from May 1998 onward.When they briefed policymakers, the military presented both the pros and cons of those strike options and the associated risks. Policymakers expressed frustration with the range of options presented.

Following the August 20, 1998, missile strikes on al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, both senior military officials and policymakers placed great emphasis on actionable intelligence as the key factor in recommending or deciding to launch military action against Bin Ladin and his organization. They did not want to risk significant collateral damage, and they did not want to miss Bin Ladin and thus make the United States look weak while making Bin Ladin look strong. On three specific occasions in 1998-1999, intelligence was deemed credible enough to warrant planning for possible strikes to kill Bin Ladin. But in each case the strikes did not go forward, because senior policymakers did not regard the intelligence as sufficiently actionable to offset their assessment of the risks.

The Director of Central Intelligence, policymakers, and military officials expressed frustration with the lack of actionable intelligence. Some officials inside the Pentagon, including those in the special forces and the counterterrorism policy office, also expressed frustration with the lack of military action.The Bush administration began to develop new policies toward al Qaeda in 2001, but military plans did not change until after 9/11.

. . . RECOMMENDATIONS

Are We Safer?

Since 9/11, the United States and its allies have killed or captured a majority of al Qaeda's leadership; toppled the Taliban, which gave al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan; and severely damaged the organization.Yet terrorist attacks continue. Even as we have thwarted attacks, nearly everyone expects they will come. How can this be?

The problem is that al Qaeda represents an ideological movement, not a finite group of people. It initiates and inspires, even if it no longer directs. In this way it has transformed itself into a decentralized force. Bin Ladin may be limited in his ability to organize major attacks from his hideouts.Yet killing or capturing him, while extremely important, would not end terror. His message of inspiration to a new generation of terrorists would continue.

Much of the public commentary about the 9/11 attacks has focused on "lost opportunities."Though characterized as problems of "watch-
listing," "information sharing," or "connecting the dots," each of these labels is too narrow.They describe the symptoms, not the disease.

Tom Kean has done the American People a great disservice by returning to the destructive and cartoonish Republican approach of dishonest demogoguery. ABC is what it is. And Republicans are what they are. But Kean was striving to be soemthing different. OR so we thought.