Both Skinner and Acosta claim that there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions for conspiracy to violate civil rights under color of law in violation of § 241. We disagree. At trial the government proved the substantive charges against Skinner and Acosta of violating civil rights under color of law, and aiding and abetting others in the commission of this crime in violation of § 242 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The proof of these substantive charges constituted some of the proof of the § 241 conspiracy charges. This proof included, inter alia, evidence that (1) Skinner falsified information for at least five search warrants and submitted false informant payment forms; (2) Skinner and Acosta participated in obtaining and executing at least three search warrants based on false information; and (3) Acosta received stolen money from these searches and stole property during two of these searches. The government also presented evidence of additional conduct by Skinner and Acosta in furtherance of the conspiracy that was not a part of the § 242 offenses, including Skinner's and Acosta's participation in a warrantless raid of a hotel room and the execution a search warrant on a home, during both of which money was stolen, and Acosta's stealing from a suspect during a traffic stop. Furthermore, the government presented evidence that Skinner, Acosta and their co-conspirators attempted to cover up the conspiracy, and agreed among themselves not to cooperate with the FBI. Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the government, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Skinner and Acosta knew of the conspiracy to deprive persons of their civil rights, and knowingly and intentionally joined, and participated in, the conspiracy. See United States v. Morgan, 385 F.3d 196, 206 (2d Cir. 2004).
Skinner also claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his misdemeanor conviction under § 242 and § 2. This conviction was based on the discovery of a laptop computer in Skinner's home that had been taken during the search of a suspect's home. Skinner argues that there was no evidence that he acted willfully, because there was no proof that he removed the laptop from the suspect's home. We disagree. The government presented evidence that (1) the laptop was found in Skinner's home, (2) officers were overheard arguing over who would get the laptop, (3) Skinner had purchased personal accessories for this laptop, (4) Skinner was the officer in charge of securing evidence during this raid, and (5) Skinner's superiors directly refuted his explanation that he had the laptop because he was analyzing it as part of an international drug investigation. A rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt either that Skinner stole the laptop, or that he aided and abetted the theft of the laptop. See United States v. Labat, 905 F.2d 18, 23 (2d Cir. 1990).
Finally, Skinner argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his felony conviction for using or carrying a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence in violation of § 924( c ), which was based on his underlying § 241 conspiracy conviction. Skinner essentially argues that, even though he was a police officer participating in the execution of search warrants and raids, the government presented insufficient evidence that he carried a firearm during these activities. We disagree. The government presented evidence that it was standard police procedure was for all members of a search team to have their weapons drawn and to keep them drawn while entering a location in connection with drug activity. This fact alone was sufficient for a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Skinner used or carried a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Every criminal defense lawyer has had clients claim that the client had something stolen during the raid. It is a common refrain. Too common:
In Arkansas a few years ago, the FBI ran a "bait car" through Crittenden County (just west of Memphis on I-40) that was wired for sound and video, driven by two Hispanic FBI agents. A drug task force officer stopped them in a profile stop and relieved them of cash. Instead of driving it to the evidence room, he drove it to the bank and deposited it into his own account. The FBI planned on doing three runs, but had to seize the money and the video of the deposit when it happened and wrap up the investigation.
Other officers were disciplined, too, in separate investigations.
A false statement conviction was affirmed in United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied 126 S.Ct. 266 (2005). One officer was acquitted.
[The first part of this entry is cross-linked to www.FourthAmendment.com.]
