When A Legislature Defunded A War
Posted on Sun Jul 22, 2007 at 09:04:43 PM EST
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This history deeply influenced the framing of our Constitution:
Charles [I of England] had inherited disagreements with Parliament from his father, but his own actions (particularly engaging in ill-fated wars with France and Spain at the same time) eventually brought about a crisis in 1628-29.. . . Tensions between the King and Parliament centred around finances, made worse by the costs of war abroad, and by religious suspicions at home. . . . In the first four years of his rule, Charles was faced with the alternative of either obtaining parliamentary funding and having his policies questioned by argumentative Parliaments who linked the issue of supply to remedying their grievances, or conducting a war without subsidies from Parliament.
. . . Charles had to recall Parliament. However, the Short Parliament of April 1640 queried Charles's request for funds for war against the Scots and was dissolved within weeks. . . .
. . . Charles was finally forced to call another Parliament in November 1640. This one, which came to be known as The Long Parliament, . . . moved on to declare ship money and other fines illegal.The King agreed that Parliament could not be dissolved without its own consent, and the Triennial Act of 1641 meant that no more than three years could elapse between Parliaments.
The Irish uprising of October 1641 raised tensions between the King and Parliament over the command of the Army. . . . Parliament . . . pass[ed] a Militia Bill allowing troops to be raised only under officers approved by Parliament. . . .
Impeachniks will like this part of the history:
On 20 January, Charles was charged with high treason 'against the realm of England'. Charles refused to plead, saying that he did not recognise the legality of the High Court (it had been established by a Commons purged of dissent, and without the House of Lords - nor had the Commons ever acted as a judicature). The King was sentenced to death on 27 January. Three days later, Charles was beheaded on a scaffold outside the Banqueting House in Whitehall, London.
Subsequently, the Restoration occurred and the King Charles II acceded to a Parliament that wielded the Spending Power. The Restoration Settlement was an organic process but the Parliament's strength was the power of the purse:
The one area that Parliament could have exerted its authority over the king was money. . . . The financial settlement was that Charles would receive £1.2MM a year. The money would come from Crown lands, custom duties and new excise duties on certain commodities. In return Charles had to surrender the Crown’s old feudal rights, such as wardships, and his prerogative powers over taxation. Therefore, Charles could not levy taxes without Parliamentary agreement. . . . In times of war, he had to ask Parliament for additional money. Though the raising of revenue had been the major cause of war between Charles I and Parliament, it was not a major issue between Charles II and Parliament.
The Restoration established that the Parliament could control the war power through the power of the purse. And the Framers of our Constitution explained that our Congress would have a similar power, as well as having the power to declare war:
Federalist 69:
The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the DECLARING of war and to the RAISING and REGULATING of fleets and armies, all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.
Federalist 26:
Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in point of efficacy, between the provision alluded to and that which is contained in the new Constitution, for restraining the appropriations of money for military purposes to the period of two years. . . . The legislature of the United States will be OBLIGED, by this provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not AT LIBERTY to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence. . . . The provision for the support of a military force will always be a favorable topic for declamation. As often as the question comes forward, the public attention will be roused and attracted to the subject, by the party in opposition; and if the majority should be really disposed to exceed the proper limits, the community will be warned of the danger, and will have an opportunity of taking measures to guard against it. . . .
Federalist 24:
standing armies [need not] be kept up in time of peace; [n]or [is] it vested in the EXECUTIVE the whole power of levying troops, without subjecting his discretion, in any shape, to the control of the legislature. . . . [T]he whole power of raising armies was lodged in the LEGISLATURE, not in the EXECUTIVE; that this legislature was to be a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people periodically elected; . . . there [is], in respect to this object, an important qualification even of the legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids the appropriation of money for the support of an army for any longer period than two years a precaution which, upon a nearer view of it, will appear to be a great and real security against the keeping up of troops without evident necessity.
Defunding of wars has a long and honorable history in the Anglo-American constitutional tradition. So when the neocons start blathering on about the unitary executive, let's not forget to remind them about Charles I, what the Founders wrote, and what our Constitution says:
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or officer thereof.
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