A news article can be TOP SECRET

that isn't what the article says at all.  It says the DISCUSSION ABOUT the article was top secret, which is certainly possible. ("Hey did you see the article in the Post about the drones?  Yeah, they got it right about the fact that we have 500 in Afghanistan, but they don't know about the 5000 we have flying over Iran every day.")

The computer systems were configured to allow unauthorized users to access the State's system resources via anonymous log-ins and passwords, default credentials, and unsecured access points. In some cases, accounts are still active for terminated employees. To make matters worse, the department doesn't know how many contractors have access to the system, and whether those contractors have gone through the proper security clearance and training.

The intent is to eclipse Mrs. Clinton's sterling record as Secretary of State, and by reduction, equate foreign service experience to, say, a no-nothing like Scott Walker--who says he can deal with ISIS  since he dealt with Wisconsin teachers by reducing their retirement and other benefits.  Or, Jeb! who took a week of try and try again, to get a Fox softball on Iraq correct.

"But given this inquiry's importance, senior F.B.I. officials have opted to keep it closely held in Washington in the agency's counterintelligence section, which investigates how national security secrets are handled."

"Those two emails were drawn out of a batch of 40 emails randomly selected from about 30,000 "work-related" emails Clinton turned over to the State Department."

"Some of the information -- such as communications intercepted via satellite or drone -- is protected under the law 18USC798, which means that they have even tighter rules and higher penalties."

"Massimo Calabresi of Time notes that the law "makes it a crime not just to knowingly mishandle such secrets, but also to use them 'in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States.'"

"Consequently, a senior intelligence official familiar with the case told Time, the FBI's investigation "will go way beyond what the intelligence community's Inspector General ever would do."

"Clinton's unusual email system was originally set up by a staffer during Clinton's 2008 presidential campaign, replacing a server used by her husband, former President Bill Clinton."

"The new server was run by Bryan Pagliano, who had worked as the IT director on Hillary Clinton's campaign before joining the State Department in May 2009. In 2013 -- the same year she left the State Department -- Clinton hired the Denver-based company Platte River Networks to oversee the system."

"It's unclear if any sensitive information was stored on the server while under Platte River's oversight. Platte River "is not cleared" to have access to classified material, Cindy McGovern, chief public affairs officer for the Defense Security Service, told The Daily Caller."

"My big issue here is do you want a small firm with little/no government experience or contracting (according to what's being reported) and no stated security expertise to be in charge of the email system for our [former] secretary of state?" Cybersecurity expert Alex McGeorge of Immunity, Inc. told Business Insider over email."

"Among the questions McGeorge has, and that will likely be investigated by the FBI, are: "How did they secure it? Were they monitoring it for intrusion? If so, how? Were there backups? If so, what kind and how often, and where are those backups now? What kind of security testing did they do, if any? Was the system subject to a penetration test by a third party? Is that report available?"

"The Times notes that the FBI "is also trying to determine whether foreign powers, especially China or Russia, gained access to Mrs. Clinton's private server, although at this point, any security breaches are speculation."

Why do you think the inspector general for intelligence and now the FBI are looking into these matters? They don't seem to be as confident, at least yet, that Clinton did everything right.

I have several questions. Did these 2 or so emails really just come from a limited sampling of 40 emails, from the 30,000 emails she gave to the State Dept? If so, aren't there likely to be a lot more troublesome emails? Or what am I missing?

"The inspector general, I. Charles McCullough III, said in a separate statement that he had found information that should have been designated as classified in four e-mails out of a "limited sample" of 40 that his agency reviewed. As a result, he said, he made the "security referral," acting under a federal law that requires alerting the FBI to any potential compromises of national security information."  Media Matters article.

Cockburn: Killchain

I've been a defense worker for the better part of 30 years, initially as a contractor and in recent years as a civil servant with the Department of the Navy (DoN).  Given my experience, I think I can answer your questions about the Abedin letter of 27 March.

I will stipulate at the outset that I agree with you that the US Government over-classifies - I've been railing against this at least since Reagan's first term.  That said, the general issue of over-classification doesn't apply in this instance.

Also, a caveat: although I'm fairly knowledgeable in the Department of Defense (DoD) and DoN regulations, I've had no occasion to look at Department of State regulations.  However, there are laws applicable to all of these as well as general principles that all should follow.

The essence of the 27 March message is a rough itinerary for Ambassador Stevens, including groups in his entourage and people he will be meeting.  The email is dated 8 days after the U.S. and allies attacked Libya on 19 March.

Question 1: How is the Abedin email "remotely classified"?  Stevens was traveling into a war zone.  Normal operational security (OPSEC) considerations would apply.  This information could be useful to terrorists or insurgents in planning an attack on the person of Stevens and/or his party, or identifying those with whom he is meeting.  Were Stevens going to Luxemburg these considerations likely wouldn't apply.  Here's a thought experiment: imagine that Secretary Clinton were traveling into a war zone.  Would her itinerary be made available ahead of time?  Of course not.  In the DoN we receive yearly refresher training in all aspects of security including OPSEC.  I can't imagine that the rules are different for people in the State Department.  The apparent lackadaisical attitude revealed in this email toward security is very disturbing.

Question 2: Who would have classified the email?  This question suggests a possible misunderstanding about what classification means.  Information can be classified because of its nature, even if not so marked.  The person bearing the initial responsibility to mark the email as classified is the originator.  The signature on the forwarded email is of someone named "Rena Bitter".  She is probably the originator.  Bitter included information that had to have violated guidelines for maintaining OPSEC in order to protect State Department officials from becoming the targets of terrorist actions.  In the parlance, this would have been a classified "spillage" - sending out classified information over an unsecured network.  This single incident could lead to a formal reprimand, loss of security clearance, and/or possible termination.

Question 3: How long would it remain classified?  It depends.  I know about DoD and DoN regs and the duration varies.  I would expect that the itinerary information would be analogous to time sensitive information that must initially be kept secure.  For example, the Germans knowing about the Normandy Invasion on 7 June 1944 could not adversely impact the course of the war.  In contrast, their knowing about the Normandy Invasion on 7 May would have been a disaster.  Some information about Normandy likely remained classified after the war.  Some information was released only a few hours after the invasion began.  After Stevens' visit much of the information would no longer need to be classified.  For details, you'll need to investigate State Department guidance on this.  I know the DoN has such guidance - the State Department must also.

Question 4: Who failed in their classification duties?  Everyone in the chain.  Ignorance is NOT an excuse.  Everyone had to be trained and retrained on a regular basis in order to retain their clearance.  If Rena Bitter initially screwed up, that in no way absolves people up the chain.  It is drummed into us that if we SUSPECT a spillage, we should contact our resident Security Officer.  What this email reveals is a POSSIBLE systemic problem with security in State.

The next statement is confusing.  It says that Hillary didn't forward the email then seems to say that she did.  It doesn't matter whether she forwarded - she had a responsibility to consult with the Security Officer if she suspected a spillage.  We assume she didn't see anything problematic about this email.  Without more header information that would allow us to know when Secretary Clinton read it, it's hard to draw further conclusions.  Maybe she didn't see it until a month later.  Maybe she saw it on 27 March.  Maybe she didn't look at the dates.  She may have deniability.  If she saw it on the 27th, then she is just as culpable as the people below her in the chain.

Question 5: What is classified in the email now?  More than four years after it was sent, nothing.  Just like information about the Normandy Invasion released in 1948 was no longer damaging.

The real issue, which is obscured by the general level of journalistic ignorance along with partisanship on BOTH sides, is that Secretary Clinton seems to have presided over an organization that was very loose - perhaps dangerously loose - on security matters.  In the attack on the compound that took the life of several Americans, including Stevens, it is fair to ask if the success of that attack was facilitated by lapses in OPSEC in the State Department headed by Hillary Clinton.  The attackers certainly evinced considerable knowledge about when and how to conduct their attack.

Best case scenario for Clinton is that all that emerges is a systemic problem with OPSEC that didn't produce any adverse consequences.  Maybe the issue goes away.  Worst case?  Clinton loses her security clearance, her competence becomes a political issue, and she's out of the race.  I think there's a 50% chance that she's done.

1. An email which includes a discussion of a news article may also contain other information.  The news article is presumably not top secret, but other information in the same email may in fact be or reflect what is top secret.

2. BTD says that the allegations of problems and classification come from the "IC" or intelligence community.  He speaks as if the IC is some vast amorphous body with vague and arbitrary and contradictory views . . . and the way to hang Clinton is to go by the most extreme and outrageous of the views held by any nut in the IC.  In fact, in at least one news article on a major media news source, I have read that it is the  state department's own IG who regards the information as being top secret . . .